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Book Reviews 
HASTHEHOUROFDEMOCRACYCOME 
ROUND AT LAST? THE NEW CRITIQUE OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM 
ON THE SUPREME COURT. By Cass R. Sunstein.' 
Harvard University Press. 1999. Pp. 290. $29.95. 
(Hardcover) 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS. By Mark Tushnet.2 Princeton University Press. 
2000. Pp. 242. $17.95. (PB) 
Stephen M. Griffin3 
After a period in which inquiries into constitutional inter-
pretation reigned supreme in American constitutional theory, 
the institutional and political questions raised by judicial review 
are again occupying the attention of American constitutional 
scholars. The new scholarship on judicial review discloses a sub-
tle shift in the well-worn (some would say worn-out) argument 
over the legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy. The most 
sophisticated scholarly contributions are avoiding the old dis-
pute over whether judicial review is countermajoritarian.4 They 
I. Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University 
of Chicago. 
2. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. 
3. Professor of Law, Tulane University. My thanks to Frank Cross for many help-
ful discussions. E-mail: <sgriffin@law.tulane.cdu>. Copyright 2000 by Stephen M. Grif-
fin. 
4. For a useful history of the debate over judicial review, sec generally Laura 
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are asking a different question: what kind of judicial review can 
be justified in a deliberative democracy? This shift is important 
because it offers the potential to move away from a stale debate 
in which believers in constitutionalism and rights face off against 
believers in democratic accountability. 
The immediate background of this theoretical shift is the 
new, complex environment of American politics at the turn of 
the century. The Supreme Court is emphasizing anew that the 
Constitution provides for a limited government of enumerated 
powers rather than giving broad grants of plenary authority.5 At 
the same time, the Court is arguably de-emphasizing its post-
New Deal role as a defender of individual rights, especially 
rights of racial and religious minorities. Moreover, it is increas-
ingly apparent that the Court is only one actor in broad political 
and social debates over the scope of rights and the limits of de-
mocratic decisionmaking. 
The new environment for judicial review is reflected in Cass 
Sunstein's One Case at a Time and Mark Tushnet's Taking the 
Constitution Away from the Courts. Although Sunstein and 
Tushnet have different takes on what the Court is doing and, es-
pecially, on what should become of the power of judicial review, 
their theories nonetheless illuminate each other. Significantly, 
both Sunstein and Tushnet examine the Supreme Court from an 
institutional perspective, rather than focusing on theories of con-
stitutional interpretation. Their books are therefore well suited 
to help us understand the legal and political context of judicial 
review at the turn of the century. 
In this review, I will first sketch the main elements of the 
new politics of judicial review; a politics that influences the way 
Sunstein and Tushnet approach the Supreme Court. I will then 
discuss the main theoretical arguments advanced by each book.6 
In the final part, I will offer some thoughts about how the new 
democratic critique of judicial review should proceed amid the 
context of what I shall call our contemporary "democracy of 
rights." 
Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (Yale U. Press, 1996). 
5. Sec, e.g., United Scates L Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
6. Theoretical, that is, as opposed to doctrinal arguments. In particular, Sunstein's 
book contains lengthy doctrinal discussions of recent Supreme Court opinions that arc 
beyond the scope of this review. 
2000] BOOK REVIEWS 685 
I. THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
On a familiar understanding of the American polity, the 
primary danger to constitutional rights originates from ignorant 
state legislatures and an occasionally whimsical Congress. The 
Supreme Court stands ready to strike down statutes that infringe 
civil rights and civil liberties. The contemporary politics of rights 
is far more complex than this simple picture allows. First, the 
Court appears to be retreating from its role as a stalwart de-
fender of constitutional rights. Tushnet begins his book with the 
Court's invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Ace 
(RFRA) in City of Boerne v. Florei and it is my impression that 
many scholars were taken aback, not only by the Court's role in 
diminishing the rights of religious groups, but by the Court's 
emphatic insistence on judicial supremacy. The Court's retreat 
is especially evident with respect to civil rights. The cases in-
volving affirmative action such as City of Richmond v. J.A. Cro-
son Co. 9 are certainly examples, but scholars have been espe-
cially critical of the course the Court has charted in voting rights, 
beginning with Shaw v. Reno 10 and Miller v. Johnson. 11 
At the same time that the Court has retreated, Congress has 
been busy expanding on its past legacy of protection for civil 
rights by attempting to redress arguable violations of rights by 
the Court itself. During the Bush administration, one of Con-
gress's main achievements was the Civil Rights Act of 1991,12 an 
act that served to reverse several Court decisions that hurt civil 
rights in the area of employment discrimination. Congress was 
not satisfied with simply reversing the Court's statutory deci-
sions, however. It also enacted important new laws such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Ad3 that created new legal rights in 
an area of discrimination in which the Court has never been ac-
tive. 
Any fair description of the institutional environment of ju-
dicial review has to account therefore for the phenomenon of 
Congress at least on occasion having greater solicitude for indi-
7. Pub. L No. 103-41,107 Stat.1488 (1993). 
8. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
9. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
10. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
11. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). For a comprehensive critique of these cases, as well as an 
excellent bibliography, see J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting 
Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (U. of North Carolina, 1999). 
12. Pub. L No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
13. Pub. L No. 101-336,104 Stat. 327 (1990). 
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vidual rights than the supposedly rights-conscious judiciary. 
This concern has continued through the 1990s. In 1994 alone, 
Congress and the President approved the Freedom of Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act, 14 the Violence Against Women Act,15 and 
the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act. 16 
The Court's new reluctance to vigorously defend individual 
rights and the steady action by the political branches to protect 
rights has important implications for traditional justifications for 
judicial review. Under the famous justification that derives from 
footnote four of Carolene Products, 17 judicial review, especially 
review based on the more ambiguous clauses in the Constitution, 
is justified if it serves to open the political process to citizens 
who are excluded or protects racial and religious minorities from 
legislation based on prejudice. If, however, the Court acts tore-
strict the political process and refuses to acknowledge the opera-
tion of racial and religious prejudice in the political system, any 
justification of judicial review based on the protection of the 
rights of minorities is seriously damaged. Since this justification 
has arguably provided the main source of legitimacy for the 
Court's activism in the post-New Deal period, this poses a seri-
ous theoretical problem for scholars, as well as a practical politi-
cal problem for the Court. 
At the same time, no one doubts that the Court stands 
ready to protect individual rights in a wide variety of contexts. 
In the course of his argument for judicial minimalism, Sunstein 
provides a very useful list of ten core principles now recognized 
by nearly everyone that constitute the foundation of contempo-
rary constitutional law. Sunstein's principles include protection 
against unauthorized imprisonment, protection of political dis-
sent, the right to vote, religious liberty, and protection against 
physical invasion of property. (pp. 64-65) Sunstein is certainly 
correct that the Court stands ready in some sense to vindicate all 
of these rights. What he does not point out is that the political 
branches stand ready as well, and have even acted to preserve 
such rights through legislation. 
It might be objected that Congress has very recently en-
acted legislation that is deeply problematic from the standpoint 
of these core principles. While the 1990s saw significant con-
14. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994). 
15. Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994). 
16. Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XXX, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994). 
17. See United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,152-53 n.4 (1938). 
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gressional action to protect individual rights, it also saw the pas-
sage of legislation that was severely criticized by legal liberals, 
such as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act' 8 (IIRIRA), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Ad9 (AEDPA), and the Prison Litigation Reform Ace0 
(PLRA). No less a civil libertarian than Anthony Lewis recently 
criticized President Clinton for signing all three laws and argued 
"the years since 1992 have been as bad a geriod as any in mem-
ory for civil liberties in the United States." 1 
The enactment of this legislation actually confirms the exis-
tence of the new politics of judicial review. For it is very 
unlikely that the Rehnquist Court will severely hamper the op-
eration of any of these laws.22 We may agree with Lewis that we 
do not have a civil libertarian Congress or President, but we do 
not have a Court conscious of civil libertarian values either. All 
three branches of government are arguably dominated by a cer-
tain bloody-mindedness when it comes to the rights of aliens and 
prisoners. This does not help justifications of judicial review 
that depend on positing a unique role for the Court in protecting 
individual and minority rights. 
The new politics of judicial review, then, is not one in which 
a majoritarian, rights-violating Congress faces off against a mi-
noritarian, rights-conscious Court. Rather rights, to borrow a 
term from the financial world, are "in play." They are an arena 
for competition, cooperation, conflict, and consensus among the 
branches of government, seemingly all at the same time. Since 
no government institution has a strong comparative advantage in 
protecting fundamental rights, traditional justifications for judi-
cial review are giving way to new arguments and concerns. The 
books under review here exemplify this trend. As I shall argue 
below, however, they certainly do not exhaust the argumentative 
possibilities. 
I 8. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
I 9. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
20. Pub. L. No. 104-134,110 Stat. 1321,1321-66 (1996). 
21. Anthony Lewis, A Bad Time for Civil Libenies, 5 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 
I, 10 (1999); see also Symposium: United States Immigration Policy at the Millennium, 
113 Harv. L. Rev. 1889,1889-1998 (2000). 
22. Among other reasons that could be cited, AEDPA and PLRA were intended to 
codify decisions made by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts that restricted rights of ap-
peal by prisoners. See generally Mark Tushnet and Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and 
Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 Duke L.J. I (1997). The Court is not likely to overturn 
statutes that ratify its decisions. 
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II. SUNSTEIN'S JUDICIOUS MINIMALISM 
In One Case at a Time, Cass Sunstein provides a theory of 
judicial review that captures something of the zeitgeist and pro-
vides a blueprint for the future of judicial review. Sunstein de-
fends "judicial minimalism," the idea that in controversial consti-
tutional cases, the Court should usually refrain from making 
sweeping, Warren Court-style statements of principle and also 
abstain from rulings that apply across the board. Unlike believ-
ers in judicial restraint, a judicial minimalist is perfectly comfort-
able with invalidating laws that conflict with the Constitution, 
but in doing so, he leaves many issues undecided. Since mini-
malist decisions do not decide all of the relevant issues, they 
leave a considerable space for political debate and discussion. 
Judicial minimalism thus promotes democratic deliberation. (p. 
4) One of Sunstein's best examples is Washington v. Glucks-
berg.23 The Court certainly did not foreclose further delibera-
tion over the right to physician-assisted suicide because the case 
did not affect any decision by individual states to either encour-
age or prohibit this practice. 
An account of Sunstein's position which emphasized noth-
ing but its minimalism and contrasted it with more "principled" 
theories of judicial review would miss the institutionalist and fal-
libilist character of his theory. Sunstein reminds us many times 
that judges, no less than legislators, are human and prone to er-
ror. It is a signal virtue of his theory that it takes this reality into 
account in a way not approximated by any other popular theory 
of judicial review. 
At the same time, as I noted in Part I, Sunstein gives mini-
malism a "substantive core" of constitutional commitments, in 
the form of a list of lines that cannot be crossed. (pp. 63-68) 
Sunstein develops his theory of minimalism with care in the first 
four chapters, but most of the book consists of explorations of 
recent Court decisions (in very long chapters that read like law 
review articles). Sunstein also defends minimalism against legal 
theorists like Justice Scalia, who would apply constitutional rules 
as widely as possible across different areas of constitutional doc-
trine, and Ronald Dworkin, who favors a theory grounded in 
deep principles worked out by Herculean justices. 
The strengths of this book are several. Sunstein performs a 
very useful service in identifying minimalism as an alternative to 
23. 521 u.s. 702 (1997). 
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both judicial activism and restraint in the debates over judicial 
review. I think there is little doubt that Sunstein has, in his idea 
of minimalism, captured something important about the way the 
Supreme Court has operated in certain recent decisions. At the 
same time, Sunstein has advanced the argument over judicial re-
view by stressing the institutional context in which the justices 
operate. This is a perspective too often ignored by scholars who 
approach the Court from the standpoint of a theory of interpre-
tation, as if the Court simply consisted of one Supreme Justice. 
Finally, the idea of a substantive core to minimalism is useful in 
reminding us that there is a great deal of agreement over the 
substance of contemporary constitutional law. 
As an approach to understanding the Supreme Court in a 
certain mode, then, Sunstein's book is helpful. But as a broader 
account of what the Court has been doing to constitutional law 
during the 1990s, his theory must be accounted a failure. In-
deed, while Sunstein's general orientation as a scholar is empiri-
cal and practical, he neglects to make an empirical case for his 
central claims that "[t]he current Supreme Court embraces 
minimalism" .... [J]udicial minimalism has been the most strik-
ing feature of American law in the 1990s." (p. xi) These are 
sweeping generalizations, yet Sunstein makes no attempt to back 
them up by showing that most recent constitutional decisions 
have been minimalist. 
Sunstein defines minimalism along two dimensions: whether 
decisions are narrow or wide and whether they are shallow or 
deep. Ideally, minimalist decisions are both narrow and shallow. 
(p. 10) They are narrow in that the Court simply decides the in-
stant case without anticipating how other analogous cases might 
be resolved. They are shallow in that they do not attempt to jus-
tify the result through a discussion of basic constitutional princi-
ples. By contrast, maximal decisions are wide and deep. Sun-
stein's best twentieth century examples of maximal decisions are 
Brown v. Board of Education24 and Reynolds v. Sims. 25 (p. 17) 
While Sunstein discusses a number of important recent con-
stitutional cases, not many of them actually fit his definition of 
minimalism. One of his principal examples of minimalism, 
United States v. Virginia (VMI),26 fails his own test in that it was 
a deeply theorized opinion, although deciding a narrow ques-
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
25. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
26. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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tion. (pp. 18-19) As I will show below, other examples he gives 
of minimalist decisions such as United States v. Lopez 27 are open 
to serious question. This leaves Sunstein with just three cases 
that meet his definition of minimalism: Washington v. Glucks-
berg,28 Romer v. Evans,29 and Denver Area Educational Tele-
communications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.30 Whatever else one 
may think of Sunstein's theory, he makes no serious attempt to 
substantiate his claim that the current Court is mostly or typi-
cally minimalist. 
In addition, Sunstein makes little effort to argue against 
some obvious counterexamples to his thesis of the current 
Court's devotion to minimalism. He makes testing his thesis 
more difficult by refusing to specify when the period of "mini-
malism" began. For example, did it begin before Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey? 31 Casey was 
clearly a wide and deep opinion in Sunstein's terms, yet he does 
not even mention it. He does not discuss the recent racial redis-
tricting cases such as Shaw v. Reno32 and Miller v. Johnson. 33 
These decisions are especially significant counterexamples to 
Sunstein's thesis in that they established a brand new cause of 
action based on the idea of "racial gerrymandering." 
Sunstein does discuss briefly the Court's commerce clause 
decision in Lopez, regarding it as "emphatically both narrow and 
shallow" because the Court "justified its decision by reference to 
a set of factors, not by a broadly applicable rule, and it gave no 
deep account of federalism." (pp. 16-17) This is far too quick. 
In the first place, Lopez is not primarily concerned with federal-
ism, but with the limits of the power of Congress. The opinion 
starts with an invocation of "first principles,"34 and the funda-
mental doctrine that "[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Gov-
ernment of enumerated powers."35 It provides a historical re-
view of all significant commerce clause precedents and organizes 
them into three general categories.36 The Court then announces 
a test to resolve the constitutionality of legislation asserted to 
27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
28. 521 u.s. 702 (1997). 
29. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
30. 518 u.s. 727 (1996). 
31. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
32 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
33. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
34. 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
35. !d. 
36. ld. at 552-59. 
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substantially affect interstate commerce: if "economic activity"37 
is regulated, then the legislation is constitutional. In defending 
its test, the Court argues that allowing more leeway to find sub-
stantial affects on interstate commerce would mean that "Con-
gress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the 
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (includ-
ing marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example."38 The 
Court implied that any future legislation involving such regula-
tion would be found unconstitutionae9 
Lopez thus poses a more complicated problem for Sun-
stein's theory than his brief discussion of the case reveals. The 
Court clearly signaled that the "economic activity" test would be 
applied to future cases, which makes the opinion "wide" in Sun-
stein's sense. More damaging, the opinion was (emphatically) 
not shallow, but deep in its wide-ranging discussion of precedent 
and fundamental reliance on the old principle that Congress is 
limited to the powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitu-
tion. There is therefore little reason to think that the current 
Court typically inclines toward minimalism in Sunstein's terms. 
One of Sunstein's minimalist justices is Justice O'Connor. 
Sunstein has to be aware that many constitutional scholars (in-
cluding Tushnet, his casebook co-author)40 regard Justice 
O'Connor as one of the more unprincipled justices in recent his-
tory, yet he does nothing to defend her record. In this respect, 
the argument presented in One Case at a Time is much more a 
defense of the position of Justice Sunstein than any justice cur-
rently on the Court. O'Connor, in fact, is barely mentioned. 
Sunstein is far more comfortable with Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer, reviewing some of their key opinions at length. As 
noted, however, Justice Ginsburg's important opinion in VMI 
does not fit Sunstein 's definition of minimalism. 
I conclude reluctantly that Sunstein's book does not meet 
the high standard he set in his first major effort on constitutional 
theory, The Partial Constitution. 41 Judicial minimalism is indeed 
defined carefully and Sunstein has a few good examples of 
37. Id. at 559. 
38. Id. at 564. 
39. The Court followed up on its insistence on the link to economic activity in strik-
ing down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
40. Sec Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution A way from the Courts 112 (Prince-
ton U. Press, 1999). 
41. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1993). 
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minimalism in action. That is not enough, however, to constitute 
what he seems to want-a general theory of judicial review in 
the 1990s. 
III. TUSHNET'S THIN CONSTITUTION 
In Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts Mark 
Tushnet concentrates on making his title theoretically plausible. 
He does not present a well-worked out plan to eliminate judicial 
review, but that is not his main purpose. Tushnet is trying to get 
scholars to ''think beyond the box" in imagining a world in 
which the task of providing authoritative (as opposed to merely 
advisory) constitutional opinions is far more widely distributed 
than it is now. In doing this, he immediately faces the problem 
of how to conceive of constitutional law. For if that law is de-
fined by the doctrines issued by the Supreme Court, then 
Tushnet's theoretical position will be frustrated at the outset. 
Under a Court-centered definition of constitutional law, any 
constitutional opinions offered by those outside the Court will 
only have validity to the extent that the Court recognizes them. 
Since such a definition is contrary to the project Tushnet wants 
to develop, Court-centered constitutional law has to go. 
To achieve an understanding of constitutional law that does 
not depend on the Court, Tushnet introduces the idea of the 
"thin" Constitution interpreted through "populist" means. (pp. 
9-14) By the thin Constitution Tushnet means the abstract prin-
ciples articulated in the Declaration of Independence and the 
Preamble to the Constitution. Tushnet argues that these princi-
ples, however general they may be, still have great persuasive 
force in public discussions of the Constitution's meaning. They 
can therefore serve as the building blocks of an alternative un-
derstanding of constitutional law, alternative, that is, to the Su-
preme Court's understanding. 
Tushnet begins his substantive discussion by taking up the 
question of how to interpret the Constitution outside the federal 
courts. He compares the respective abilities of Congress and the 
Court to interpret the Constitution because he knows that many 
doubt the ability of Congress to take the Constitution seriously. 
Here, however, Tushnet seems to ask a question that is at odds 
with the larger purposes of his enterprise. Asking whether 
members of Congress can offer sophisticated interpretations of 
the Constitution (as Tushnet does in his discussion of the flag 
burning cases), assumes that Court-like, legalistic interpretations 
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of the Constitution should constitute the baseline for compari-
son. Since the whole notion of populist constitutional law is not 
particularly legalistic to begin with, this misses the mark. 
A better question, one consistent with Tushnet's introduc-
tory discussion of the invalidation of RFRA in City of Boerne,42 
is whether Congress takes constitutional rights seriously. Mem-
bers of Congress may not reason in the same manner as justices, 
but politics may have a logic of its own, a logic that is equal to 
the task of providing constitutional meaning, even as it may dis-
comfit legal scholars who are comfortable with the more formal 
style of reasoning characteristic of legal briefs and Court opin-
ions. Tushnet should have spent more time reviewing Con-
gress's record on fulfilling the broad purposes of our constitu-
tional order (such as the protection of individual rights) rather 
than apologizing for the inability of its members to mimic the ju-
dicial style. 
Tushnet hits his stride when he asks whether the Constitu-
tion is "incentive compatible" or self-enforcing. (pp. 95-96) He 
argues that with respect to federalism and separation of powers 
matters such as impeachment, the Constitution has indeed 
proven to be self-enforcing. That is, the constitutional order has 
preserved itself over time without the need for intervention from 
the Court. At this point, I can imagine many scholars objecting 
that the Constitution cannot be expected to be self-enforcing 
with respect to fundamental rights. After all, they might say, 
one characteristic feature of majoritarian democracy is its rou-
tine use of power to violate the rights of minorities. That's what 
majorities do. They cannot be left with the responsibility of en-
forcing constitutional rights when their self-interest is antitheti-
cal to that very task. 
It is here that conventional wisdom meets current political 
reality and Tushnet's best arguments. As I observed in Part I, it 
can be argued that the Supreme Court has lost its comparative 
advantage over Congress and the President in creating and en-
forcing constitutional rights. This is why Tushnet finds the in-
validation of RFRA to be at once disturbing and suggestive. In 
RFRA, Congress attempted to provide additional protection for 
the constitutional rights of all religious groups, arguably in ser-
vice of its power under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment. But the Court threw out Congress's action in the name of 
42. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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preserving judicial supremacy. When push came to shove, the 
Court preferred protecting its exclusive right to articulate au-
thoritative constitutional meaning to the task of protecting indi-
vidual rights. 
Tushnet's way of advancing this argument is to turn theta-
bles on legal liberals by showing that at the same time the Court 
refuses to help racial and religious minorities, it uses its power to 
further the predominantly majoritarian interests of business 
groups through doctrines such as commercial speech under the 
first amendment. The Court has created other problems for le-
gal liberals. Liberals often believe in the desirability of cam-
paign finance reform, but Buckley v. Valeo43 stands in the way. 
Liberals want to see those accused of crimes treated fairly and 
the death penalty abolished while the Court has shredded War-
ren Court protections for criminal defendants and wants death 
row inmates executed faster. Finally, if you belong to a group 
that has been historically discriminated against, such as African-
Americans, the Rehnquist Court is not your friend. 44 
What about areas in which the Court obviously votes in fa-
vor of liberal positions, such as abortion, school prayer, and the 
right of free speech in cyberspace? Here Tushnet usefully high-
lights the subtle negative effects of even undoubted liberal victo-
ries. He observes that legal conservatives who are on the losing 
side in all of these cases do not simply go away, accept the 
Court's opinion, and join the liberal consensus. Rather, they 
generate an unexpected side effect: the new politics of constitu-
tional rights. They lobby for legislation that would nullify the 
Court's decisions in practical terms. They articulate "counter-
rights" founded in constitutional interpretation that the Court 
may someday recognize. They fund legal foundations to ad-
vance their point of view through continuous litigation. And, 
most important, they attempt to affect the judicial appointment 
process so that, in the fullness of time, their point of view will 
prevail. 
So even liberal victories do not provide closure in the new 
politics of rights. They seem rather to generate more contro-
versy and efforts to overturn them. At best, liberals who rely on 
the Court to protect individual rights must be watchful of the 
appointment process to ensure that conservatives prone to over-
43. 424 u.s. 1 (1976). 
44. Sec, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Race Against the Court: The Supreme Court and 
Minorities in Contemporary America (New York U. Press, 1993). 
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turn precedents are not placed on the Court. Liberals have 
tended to react to the new politics of rights by being defensive 
rather than thinking creatively about new constitutional prob-
lems. This defensiveness means that liberals have had difficulty 
articulating a new agenda for constitutional law beyond simply 
protecting the past. In defending a Court that does not defend 
them, liberals have lost their way. 
Since I have been doing more explicating than criticizing, it 
should be evident that I find Tushnet's book more stimulating 
than Sunstein's sometimes labored effort. While I do not think 
anyone could fairly accuse Sunstein of writing unclearly, he 
tends to burden his argument for minimalism with so many 
qualifications that his real position becomes opaque. Tushnet's 
vigorously argued book leaves no such impression. 
IV. TOWARD A NEW DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUE OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
For quite some time, the debate over the proper role of the 
Supreme Court in American democracy has been understood in 
terms of the "countermajoritarian difficulty. "45 While Sunstein 
and Tushnet strongly favor democracy as a value, it is notable 
that their critiques of judicial review are not based on this fa-
mous argument. Sunstein's theory is founded on the idea of "de-
liberative democracy," which is explained in much greater detail 
in his earlier work than in One Case at a Time.46 As described 
earlier, Tushnet favors "populist" constitutional law and notes 
that contemporary legal liberals seem inordinately afraid of 
submitting any constitutional issue to a vote. (p. 177-81) 
To understand the possibilities that both of these books 
open for a new democratic critique of judicial review, I begin 
with the observation that the countermajoritarian objection was 
presented in the main as an external critique of the Court. That 
is, the critique posited that there was a norm (democratic ac-
countability or majority rule) that the Court should comply with 
but could not due to the fact that it was not elected. Defenders 
of judicial review replied that the democratic norm was not the 
only norm in the game. Judicial review upheld the principles of 
45. Sec Stephen M. Griffin, American Constitwionalism: From Theory to Politics 
107 (Princeton U. Press, 1996). 
46. In particular, s..:c Sunst..:in, Partial Constitwion (cited in note 41). 
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constitutionalism and individual rights either against democratic 
rule or as a more abstract fulfillment of it. 
By contrast, the new critique of judicial review is an internal 
critique. It starts by accepting the assumption of the Court's de-
fenders that constitutional and legal rights, especially those that 
protect minority racial and religious groups, are inherently valu-
able and deserve promotion and defense. So Sunstein and 
Tushnet in effect embrace the view that rights and democracy 
are compatible, not conflicting. But they do not draw the con-
clusion many scholars would: that the Court should be supreme 
in defining what rights we have. Sunstein's and Tushnet's argu-
ments point toward the idea that a space has opened in Ameri-
can government in which constitutional rights can be safely de-
fined through the democratic process itself We now live in what 
could be called a "democracy of rights." Here, my argument in 
Part I that the Court has lost its comparative advantage over the 
political branches in the promotion and defense of individual 
rights has particular significance. Congress is now just as adept 
as the Court at protecting individual rights. Indeed, some of the 
most important statutory protections of basic rights adopted dur-
ing the past twenty years have been the consequence of congres-
sional reactions to Court decisions restricting statutory and con-
stitutional rights. 47 
From the standpoint of legal liberals, perhaps the most im-
portant reason the current Supreme Court does not have a ster-
ling reputation in defending individual rights is that it has, in ef-
fect, been penetrated by majoritarian interests. Here a sea 
change in the Supreme Court appointments process has been 
especially significant. As Mark Silverstein and David Yalof have 
demonstrated in their studies,48 the appointment process has un-
dergone a qualitative change centered on a new awareness that 
took root in the 1960s that the Supreme Court was playing an 
important role in setting the national policy agenda. As 
Silverstein argues, "[t]he current [Supreme Court confirmation] 
process is disorderly, contentious, and unpredictable. In short, it 
is now a thoroughly democratic process, and the increased public 
47. Sec, e.g., Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205,96 Stat. 
131; Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166. 105 Stat. 1071; Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488. 
48. Set: Mark Silverstein, Judicious Choices: The New Policies of Supreme Courc 
Conflrmacions (W.W. Norton & Co., 1994); David Alistair Yalof, Pursuic of Juscices: 
Presidemial Policies and che Seleccion of Supreme Courc Nominees (U. of Chicago Press, 
1999). 
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participation in the selection of federal judges and Supreme 
Court justices is a consequence of profound changes in Ameri-
can politics and institutions. The most important development is 
the heightened activism of the modern federal judiciary. "49 
Yalof's account of the Reagan administration's effort to an-
ticipate vacancies on the Supreme Court is particularly instruc-
tive. When Edwin Meese became Attorney General at the be-
ginning of Reagan's second term, he created a task force to find 
potential nominees to the Court should a vacancy open up. 50 
The task force identified twelve factors they considered in as-
sessing nominees. Among them were such items as: '"awareness 
of the importance of strict justiciability and procedural require-
ments"'; "'refusal to create new constitutional rights for the in-
dividual"'; "'deference to states in their spheres'"; '"recognition 
that the federal government is one of enumerated powers"'; and 
"'respect for traditional values."' 51 The task force looked for 
federal judges who met the requirements and produced a report 
for each judge reviewing their opinions. Yalof notes, "[n]ever 
before in history had there been such an excruciatingly detailed 
examination of judicial rulings by the Justice Department in an-
ticipation of a Supreme Court nomination. "52 
When the Supreme Court is subject to this sort of minute 
scrutiny by the executive branch, as well as interest groups, it is 
no longer possible for it to maintain any cons~stent posture with 
respect to the protection of individual rights.)3 Indeed, it is ar-
guable that under such scrutiny, the Court cannot maintain con-
sistently any sort of institutional role at all (other than to pre-
serve the doctrine of judicial supremacy). So the current Court 
has become another forum in which political battles over indi-
vidual rights and the power of government are played out. It is 
closely balanced between the contending sides and each presi-
dential election and potential vacancy is monitored for its poten-
tial impact on constitutional issues. 54 
49. Silverstein .Judicious Choices at 6 (cited at note 48) (footnote omitted). 
50. Yalof. Pursuit of Justices at 142-43 (cited in note 48). 
51. !d. at 143-44 (quoting internal Justice Department task force report). 
52. !d. at 144. 
53. I am assuming. of course, that the presidency tends to rotate between Republi-
cans and Democrats. It is worth keeping in mind that the last president who was able to 
appoint a five-member majority to the Court was Franklin Delano Roos..:velt. R..:ccnt 
presidents have not been as fortunate. 
54. Sec, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., The Tipping Point, Nat'! J. 1810 (June 10, 2000). 
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While I suggested above that from a legal liberal standpoint, 
the Court has been taken over by majoritarian interests, obvi-
ously this is too simple. When all three branches of government 
are in the business of protecting at least some constitutional 
rights, the vocabulary of the "countermajoritarian difficulty," 
with its contrast between majoritarian legislatures and a minori-
tarian Court no longer makes sense. In the new democratic cri-
tique of the judicial review, the issue becomes not under what 
circumstances fundamental rights should be protected against 
legislative incursion, but rather what rights should be created, 
who should enforce them, and which institution should have the 
last word with respect to their scope and meaning. Sunstein and 
Tushnet both realize this at least implicitly, which is why they do 
not even mention the famous difficulty in developing critiques 
(and, in Sunstein's case, a justification) of judicial review. 
For veteran observers of the debate over judicial review, 
however, I imagine that this new democratic critique will seem 
somewhat puzzling. Since by my description the new critique 
accepts the importance of individual rights and judicial review to 
protect them, what is left to argue about? The countermajori-
tarian difficulty led at least some scholars to argue against cer-
tain kinds of judicial review, such as the use of the substantive 
due process doctrine.55 By contrast, the new critique does not 
seem to have any democratic bite. 
The broad point made by the new democratic critique is 
that judicial review today is exercised in a "democracy of rights." 
In defining a democracy of rights in a practical sense, three char-
acteristics seem especially salient: (1) individual constitutional 
and legal rights are viewed as important and useful by all; (2) all 
three branches of the national government, as well as state and 
local governments, have had some success creating, promoting, 
and enforcing such rights; and (3) the judicial branch is recog-
nized clearly as a key forum for testing rights claims by political 
interests who support or oppose judicial nominations to advance 
their rights agenda. This last characteristic is especially impor-
tant. The politicization or democratization of the Supreme 
Court appointment process means that it is difficult for the 
Court to have a special role, beyond that enjoyed by any other 
branch of government, in advancing the rights agenda of any 
particular group. Indeed, it makes it unlikely that the Court can 
55. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 14-18 
(Harvard U. Press, 1980). 
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perform a special function in educating the citizenry or assuming 
a vanguard role to promote a national dialogue on rights. 56 In-
stead, the democratization of the Court means that it is ensnared 
in the same contentious politics of rights that occupies the politi-
cal branches. 
One substantial implication of the new critique is that judi-
cial review should never be exercised to restrict the scope of any 
constitutional ri~ht.57 That is, the "one-way ratchet" of Katzen-
bach v. Morgan 8 should be reinstated: if Congress acts to pro-
vide rights protection beyond that afforded by judicial doctrine, 
the Court should give way (provided that Congress does not ac-
complish its goal by infringing on some other constitutional 
right). This means that City of Boerne was wrong and should be 
overruled by the political branches acting through future Court 
appointments. 
The new democratic critique replaces the emphasis of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty on the need for government insti-
tutions to be majoritarian with an emphasis on creating and en-
forcing constitutional and legal rights. During the heyday of the 
difficulty, for example, scholars argued over whether Congress 
was really majoritarian and whether the Supreme Court was 
really unaccountable to anyone.59 The terms of the debate were 
thus set by the value assumption that government institutions 
had to be majoritarian. The new democratic critique creates a 
different arena for debate: which branch or level of government 
does best in creating and enforcing rights? 
Of course, even (and especially) in a democracy of rights, 
what rights we should have is a controversial question. The fact 
that rights are debated about in a democratic way is no guaran-
tee that justice will prevail. Some might see the idea of a democ-
racy of rights as a cruel joke in the light of such statutes as 
IIRIRA, AEDPA, and the PLRA. Legislatures can refuse to 
create rights and repeal others assumed to exist. They can subtly 
alter the balance of power among litigants in the judicial system 
56. For an argument that the Court can perform these roles, see, e.g., 1 Laurence 
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 27 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2000). 
57. For a detailed argument on this score, see Frank B. Cross, Institutions and En-
forcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529 (2000). 
58. 384 U.S 641 (1966). 
59. Sec, e.g., Jesse H. Chopcr, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A 
Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 4-59 (U. of Chicago Press, 
1980). Some scholars arc still doing this. Sec, e.g., Tribe, American Constitutional Law 
at 307-09 (cited in note 56). 
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by restricting the jurisdiction of the courts. Congress can indeed 
do all of these things, but the Senate, along with the President, 
also happens to appoint everyone who sits on the federal bench. 
Once politicians are aware of the Supreme Court as a significant 
player on the political scene, it is unwise to expect it to be im-
mune from their influence. Thus like Congress, the Court some-
times refuses to create rights that would assist those lacking jus-
tice (at least, lacking justice from a particular political point of 
view) and occasionally declares that rights thought to exist do so 
no longer. 
That rights claims are controversial does not constitute an 
objection to the idea of a democracy of rights; it rather confirms 
it. What is the best way to decide what rights should be created 
and how they should be enforced? As a result of the democrati-
zation of the judiciary, we could look at this question as a fait ac-
compli: since there is no alternative in a broad sense to debating 
about rights politically, we might as well accept our circum-
stances and get on with the task. But the concept of a democ-
racy of rights is more attractive than this. 
The justification of a democracy of rights stands at the in-
tersection of three strands of complementary argument: the first 
practical and political, the second theoretical, and the third his-
torical. In this review, I have been concerned only with sketch-
ing the first argument-that a survey of our contemporary politi-
cal circumstances shows that all three branches of the national 
government are interested in creating and enforcing rights. To 
make a democracy of rights truly plausible, I need to explain its 
theoretical basis in terms of a normative argument about the de-
sirability of democratic government and its historical basis in an 
argument that the United States has only recently become a 
"democracy" worthy of the name. 60 
I hope, however, that I have at least introduced the idea of a 
democracy of rights with sufficient clarity to show that there is 
an alternative way of critiquing judicial review from a democ-
ratic perspective. This alternative does not depend on the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty or any assumption that the American 
constitutional system is based on majority rule or popular sover-
60. I hope to accomplish both of these tasks in a forthcoming article. Sec Stephen 
M. Griffin, Judicial Re,·iew in a Democracy of Rigllls (paper presented at the 2000 meet-
ing of the American Political Science Association) (on file with author). I did advance 
the historical argument I refer to here in Griffin, American Constitutionalism at 102-04, 
116-18 (cited in note 45). 
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eignty. It is, instead, based on the practical plausibility of the 
idea that in our contemporary democracy, rights and politics go 
hand in hand. 
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If there is any good justification for the economic cartel in 
legal services, perhaps it lies in our aspirations as a learned pro-
fession. In recent years, those aspirations-or pretensions-
have been looking insecure. On one side, the practice of law has 
become harder to distinguish from other business ventures, for it 
is increasingly specialized and ever more openly oriented toward 
profit maximization. On another side, legal academics seem to 
have less and less to do with the practicing bar and the concerns 
of its members. At least in law schools where scholarship is re-
warded, success is practically defined as getting yourself taken 
seriously by other academics at similar institutions. When 
someone is said to deserve tenure on the basis of a "widely 
cited" article, it's usually assumed that this does not refer to cita-
tions in CLE materials or legal briefs. 
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